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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS LIMITS: 
LESSONS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION IN CALIFORNIA 
Joseph R. Grodin* 
California’s pressing structural problems require changes to the 
California Constitution that may be difficult to accomplish through the 
current constitution’s three stated means of reform. In response, 
coalition reform groups, such as Repair California, have proposed 
amending the constitution to authorize the calling of a constitutional 
convention through an initiative measure. This Article focuses on the 
state, constitutional, and procedural issues that may arise from such a 
change. Through an analysis of the relevant California Supreme Court 
decisions since 1911, this Article concludes that there is indeed a 
principled basis for sustaining the constitutional validity of an initiative 
measure amending the constitution to permit a constitutional 
convention called by the people, for authorizing a different method of 
selecting convention delegates, and for allowing such an initiative to 
limit the convention’s scope to certain specified subjects. 
 
 * Distinguished Emeritus Professor, University of California Hastings College of the Law; 
former Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. The author wishes to acknowledge the 
valuable assistance of several Hastings students, including Amy Stein, Eric Martin, Erin Kuka, 
and Kerry Galusha. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Whether a constitutional convention is a good idea for 
California as a way to try and resolve the pressing structural 
problems that confront the state is, no doubt, a debatable question. 
There are legitimate concerns about the time and resources required, 
about the recommendations that would be forthcoming, and about 
each of the recommendation’s individual acceptability to the 
electorate. There are also powerful arguments supporting the position 
that nothing short of a constitutional convention is likely to bring 
about the needed changes. This Article focuses on the state 
constitutional, procedural issues that are likely to arise from any 
proposal for a convention that departs from the format prescribed by 
the current California Constitution. I take for my model the 
propositions that were advanced in 2010 by coalition reform group 
Repair California1 but that did not qualify for placement on the 
ballot. 
The California Constitution provides in article XVIII three 
methods by which the constitution may be changed: (1) it can be 
amended through a popular initiative, i.e., an initiative measure 
placed on the ballot through petitions carrying the requisite number 
of signatures; (2) it can be amended or revised through a legislative 
initiative, i.e., a measure placed on the ballot through a two-thirds 
vote of each house of the legislature; or (3) it can be revised through 
a constitutional convention.2 
The popular-initiative amendment process is potentially 
available for narrowly targeted changes, but any “structural” 
changes, such as those presented in many of the proposals that have 
been advanced, are likely to be considered “revisions” rather than 
“amendments” and thus not amenable to that procedure.3 The 
legislative initiative process is potentially available for revisions as 
well as amendments, and would be well suited to the sorts of 
 
 1. See About the Convention, REPAIR CAL., http://www.repaircalifornia.org/ 
about_california_convention.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 2. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII. California’s procedure for constitutional change through 
initiative is virtually unique. See generally TIP H. ALLEN, JR. & COLEMAN B. RANSON, JR., 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962) (summarizing the many state 
procedures for constitutional revision and amendment). 
 3. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 23 (1993). 
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structural changes that have been proposed, especially through the 
medium of a “Constitution Revision Commission,” which has been 
used in the past to make recommendations to the legislature for 
placement on the ballot. 4 However, in the present state of political 
disarray, the likelihood of two-thirds of each house of the legislature 
agreeing to place any even mildly controversial proposal on the 
ballot appears slim. That leaves the convention alternative. 
Article XVIII, section 2 provides as follows: 
The Legislature by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-
thirds of the membership of each house concurring, may 
submit at a general election the question whether to call a 
convention to revise the Constitution. If the majority vote 
yes on that question, within 6 months the Legislature shall 
provide for the convention. Delegates to a constitutional 
convention shall be voters elected from districts as nearly 
equal in population as may be practicable. 5 
So, the possibility exists that the legislature could propose a 
convention pursuant to article XVIII, section 2. But the proponents 
of the Repair California initiatives were concerned about the 
following potential problems: (1) the probability of two-thirds of the 
members of each house of the legislature agreeing to a call for a 
convention is small, smaller even than the probability of the 
legislature agreeing to propose specific constitutional revisions; (2) 
the prescribed method for selection of delegates through popular 
election would not be acceptable to those (presumably numerous) 
citizens who would likely view it as a means of replicating the 
existing and unpopular legislative bodies; and (3) no call for a 
convention is likely to succeed, unless the convention’s subject 
matter can be limited in advance. 6 
 
 4. See generally Eugene G. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CPS BRIEF 3, 
4–6 (1991), available at http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/california_history.pdf (providing 
background following passage of ACR 188, which requires in part the presentation of alternative 
proposals for constitutional revision). 
 5. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Mike Aldax, State Seeking Conventional Wisdom on Constitution, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/State-seeking-
conventional-wisdom-on-constitution-76349807.html; Hendrik Hertzberg, The States We’re In, 
NEW YORKER, Aug. 24 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/08/24/ 
090824taco_talk_hertzberg; Elise Viebeck, Failed Convention Post-Mortem, CAL. WATCHDOG 
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.calwatchdog.com/2010/03/18/new-failed-convention-post-mortem. 
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Acting on these premises, Repair California and its supporters 
advanced an initiative measure to amend article XVIII by adding 
provisions to authorize calling a constitutional convention through an 
initiative measure. Further, that initiative measure would have both 
prescribed a procedure for selection of delegates and limited the 
subject matter the delegates could consider—with the limitation 
being enforceable through judicial writ. A companion initiative 
measure, contingent upon passage of the first, would have called for 
a convention pursuant to that authorization.7 
The doctrine of popular sovereignty supported the legal theory 
behind this proposal. That doctrine finds expression in article II, 
section 1 of the state constitution: “All political power is inherent in 
the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, 
and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the 
public good may require.”8 The threshold questions, which apply 
both to the legitimacy of bypassing the legislature and to the 
designation of a different method for selecting delegates, are whether 
“the people,” having once chosen a particular procedure for altering 
or amending their form of government, are forever limited by that 
choice, or whether they may adopt a different procedure, and if so, 
how? Since the constitution says nothing about limiting or not 
limiting a convention’s subject matter, the question of whether a call 
for a convention may effectively provide for limitations is of a 
different order, and will be considered last. 
II.  MAY THE INITIATIVE PROCESS BE USED TO MODIFY THE 
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION TO PROVIDE THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION CAN BE CALLED THROUGH USE OF THE  
INITIATIVE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE ACTION? 
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of relevant judicial authority on 
this question. In several cases state courts have upheld, in the 
absence of express constitutional authority, the validity of wholesale 
constitutional revisions adopted by the voters upon submission by 
the state legislature. In these cases, the courts relied on the theory of 
popular sovereignty to conclude that the convention procedure was 
not necessarily the exclusive procedure by which the state 
 
 7. See Constitutional Convention Ballot Measures Fact Sheet, REPAIR CAL., 
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/repair_california_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 8. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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constitution could be changed, and that ultimate ratification of the 
legislative proposals by the people was sufficient. 9 
These cases have been subject to criticism, both in judicial 
opinion 10 and in scholarly writing, 11 and it appears from dicta in its 
early decision in Livermore v. Waite 12 that the California Supreme 
Court might have sided with the naysayers on the issue that those 
cases addressed. The legislature sought to place on the ballot a 
constitutional amendment to what was then article XX, section 1 of 
the state constitution. The purpose was to change the seat of 
government from Sacramento to San Jose, but by its terms the 
amendment would not become effective unless the state received a 
“donation” of $1 million and ten acres of land in San Jose, and 
elected state officials approved the new site. 13 In a taxpayer action to 
restrain the secretary of state from taking steps to submit the 
proposal to the electors, the trial court granted an injunction, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed. 14 
 
 9. Wheeler v. Board of Trs., 37 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1946) (holding that a legislative 
submission of proposed new constitution to the people for ratification was a permissible method 
of revising the constitution, and any constitutional defect cured by a vote of the people is in the 
exercise of their sovereignty); Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1970); Gatewood v. 
Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (discussing the submission of a draft constitution 
to the electorate as being merely an exercise of the people’s inherent right to change their 
government, and that the constitutionally prescribed procedures for adopting a new constitution 
need not be followed). 
 10. State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864 (Ala. 1983) (rejecting the reasoning in these cases and 
insisting on strict adherence to constitutionally prescribed procedures). 
 11. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of State Constitutions: Legislative 
Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473 (1987); Recent 
Case, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions: Legislature May Disregard Prescribed 
Procedure as Long as the Proposed Constitution Is Submitted for Popular Ratification: 
Gatewood v. Matthews, 81 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1968). There exists a wealth of debate over the 
notion of sovereignty and the validity of extra-textual change under the U.S. Constitution. See, 
e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (arguing people retain an unenumerated right to alter the U.S. 
Constitution by means other than those prescribed by article V); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the 
Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1995) 
(criticizing Amar’s theory and positing that constitutional change is legitimate only when it 
represents the will of the people as a whole acting in their sovereign capacity); James W. Torke, 
Assessing the Ackerman and Amar Theses: Notes on Extratextual Constitutional Change, 4 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229 (1994). Because there exists in the federal system characteristics of dual 
sovereignty—the states and the people—the issues are not precisely the same. 
 12. 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894). 
 13. Id. at 424–25. 
 14. Id. at 425–28. 
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The actual holding in Livermore was quite narrow. The 
constitution at that time permitted an amendment to be placed on the 
ballot by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature, and were 
it not for the conditions the legislature attached, there would have 
been no problem. But, the court said: 
The Legislature was not authorized by the framers of the 
constitution, nor do the terms of that instrument permit it to 
propose any amendment that will not, upon its adoption by 
the people, become an effective part of the constitution, nor 
is it authorized to propose an amendment which, if ratified, 
will take effect only at the will of other persons, or upon the 
approval by such persons of some specific act or 
condition . . . . Such a proposition is legislative in character, 
rather than [constitutional]. 15 
The court’s opinion in Livermore, however, contains rather 
expansive dicta: 
Article 18 of the constitution provides two methods by 
which changes may be effected in that instrument, one by a 
convention of delegates chosen by the people for the 
express purpose of revising the entire instrument, and the 
other through the adoption of by the people of propositions 
for specific amendments that have been previously 
submitted to it by two-thirds of the members of each branch 
of the legislature. It can be neither revised nor amended 
except in the manner prescribed by itself, and the power 
which it has conferred upon the legislature in reference to 
proposed amendments, as well as to calling a convention, 
must be strictly pursued. Under the first of these methods, 
the entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the 
convention. The character and extent of a constitution that 
may be framed by that body is freed from any limitations 
other than those contained in the constitution of the United 
States . . . . The power of the Legislature to initiate any 
change in the existing organic law is, however, of greatly 
less extent and, being a delegated power, is to be strictly 
 
 15. Id. at 427. 
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construed under the limitations by which it has been 
conferred. 16 
While Livermore spoke in terms of limits on legislative 
authority, similar reasoning underlaid the California court’s 
subsequent decision in McFadden v. Jordan, 17 to the effect that the 
initiative process cannot be used to adopt a constitutional revision, as 
distinguished from an amendment. 18 The proposed initiative in that 
case, addressing multifarious subjects, was deemed to constitute a 
revision and was therefore not an appropriate subject for the 
initiative power. 
But all of these cases involved attempts to obtain voter approval 
for constitutional changes submitted contrary to constitutionally 
prescribed procedures. To the extent that courts have insisted on 
compliance with such procedures, the courts have implemented the 
citizens’ original (and sovereign) intent. That is quite different, 
however, from saying that the prescribed procedures may not be 
changed, as was proposed in the draft initiative to allow the initiative 
to be used to call for a constitutional convention. 
But then the question remains whether the initiative process may 
properly be used to make such a change or whether such a change 
can only be made through a revision either propounded by the 
legislature or adopted by a constitutional convention proposed by the 
legislature. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. 
State Board of Equalization, 19 the court, while upholding Proposition 
13’s sweeping tax reforms as merely an amendment, acknowledged 
that “even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far 
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to 
amount to a revision.” 20 Proposition 13 did not reach that level 
because the measure’s qualitative effects on the distribution of 
powers between state and local government, and on local 
government, were neither substantial nor novel. 21 
 
 16. Id. at 425. 
 17. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948). 
 18. Id. at 789. 
 19. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978). 
 20. Id. at 1286. 
 21. See id. at 1284–89 (explaining that the analysis for determining whether a particular 
constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment must be both quantitative and qualitative 
in nature and then outlining the reasons why Proposition 13 fails to meet that standard). 
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In Raven v. Deukmejian, 22 the court, for the first (and only) time, 
struck down an initiative as constituting a revision on “qualitative” 
grounds. There, it held that a measure that would have required 
California courts, in applying state constitutional provisions in 
criminal proceedings, to adhere to interpretations of similar 
provisions in the U.S. Constitution would make such a fundamental 
change in the role of the judiciary and in the rights of criminal 
defendants as to constitute a revision rather than an amendment. 23 
Two years later, in Legislature of California v. Eu, 24 the court upheld 
use of the initiative to establish term limits for legislators and to limit 
amounts that could be spent on legislative staffs. 25 This was an 
amendment because it left the legislative branch substantially 
unchanged; the test, the court said, is whether it appears “necessarily 
or inevitably . . . from the face of the challenged provision that the 
measure will substantially alter the basic governmental framework 
set forth in our Constitution.” 26 Most recently, in Strauss v. Horton, 27 
the court upheld Proposition 8, which modified the constitution to 
declare marriage an institution involving a man and a woman, 
contrary to the court’s own prior decision declaring same-sex 
couples’ right to marry to be a fundamental right protected by both 
the privacy and equal protection provisions of the California 
Constitution. 28 Such a change, the court said, constitutes an 
amendment rather than a revision: as a quantitative matter, 
Proposition 8 “adds but a single, simple section to the 
Constitution,” 29 and as a qualitative matter, “the act of limiting 
access to the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples does 
not have a substantial, or indeed even a minimal effect on the 
governmental plan or framework of California that existed prior to 
the amendment.” 30 
 
 22. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
 23. See id. at 1079–90 (holding that, for the first time in California’s history, Proposition 115 
substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme to the extent that it directly contradicts 
well-established jurisprudential principles). 
 24. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 1319. 
 27. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 28. Id. at 59, 122. 
 29. Id. at 62. 
 30. Id. 
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So, would a measure authorizing use of the initiative to call for a 
constitutional convention have a substantial effect on the 
governmental plan or framework of California? Arguably, it would 
by making it easier to bring about such a convention. And if that 
argument is correct, then there would be no way to achieve the 
sought-after result short of persuading two-thirds of each house of 
the legislature either to propose such a change or to propose a 
constitutional convention at which such a change could be adopted. 
But if that argument is correct, what about the 1962 
modification—achieved through the initiative process—which, for 
the first time, gave the legislature the authority to propose 
constitutional revisions without the necessity of calling a 
convention? 31 Did that not have a substantial effect on the 
governmental plan or framework of the state? And more 
fundamentally, what about the 1911 initiative, which introduced 
direct democracy into state governance? 32 It is difficult to imagine a 
more substantial change in government structure than the people 
asserting the power to bypass the legislature’s lawmaking ability (the 
initiative) and blocking the implementation of laws adopted by the 
legislature (the referendum). Yet, it appears that no question was 
raised as to the people’s power to make those changes through the 
ballot, rather than through a constitutional convention, which, then as 
now, the legislature was unlikely to propose. And if that is the case, 
then both of these changes should have been regarded as invalid. But 
it does not appear that such an objection was ever raised, and 
certainly not in court. How do we explain these constitutional 
phenomena? 
One possible explanation is that in these ancient times, before 
the enlightenment of Raven, it was assumed that only a completely 
new constitution would qualify as a revision, leaving all other 
changes possible through amendment. 33 But while the Livermore 
court did mention a “revision of the entire constitution” 34 as its only 
 
 31. See GRODIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 302. 
 32. Id. at 17–18. 
 33. The 1849 constitution used the phrase “entire constitution” in relation to “revision,” but 
the 1879 constitution eliminated the word “entire.” Whether that change is of significance is 
debatable. See Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power 
in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1219 n.343 (1998). 
 34. Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 426 (Cal. 1894). 
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example of what would fall in the revision category, it said that the 
term “amendment implies such an addition or change within the lines 
of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better 
carry out the purpose for which it was framed.” 35 Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the court thought a legislatively proposed amendment 
could be used for anything short of adopting a completely revised 
document or that it would have regarded the wholesale transfer of 
power from the legislature to the people through direct democracy as 
constituting a mere “improvement” within the lines of the original 
document. 
Moreover, whatever the proper line of distinction between a 
revision and an amendment prior to Raven was, does the “modern” 
test mean that the 1911 and 1962 changes should now be held invalid 
because they both involved substantial changes to the governmental 
plan or framework? Or is it, because of some implicit limitation 
period on the assertion of constitutional objections, simply too late to 
raise that question? 36 
Perhaps the better answer is that both the 1911 and 1962 
amendments lay within the people’s power to facilitate and extend 
the expression of their own sovereignty. In one case they did so by 
providing for direct popular control over lawmaking and in the other 
by making it easier to effect constitutional change. Such processes by 
which those changes were made either lay outside the traditional 
distinction between amendment and revision or constituted 
amendments rather than revisions because they did not affect the 
distribution of powers among the branches. 
In any event, the court’s apparent openness since Raven to use 
the initiative to make constitutional change, as well as the precedents 
established by the unchallenged changes from 1911 and 1962, tend 
to support the view that an initiative measure to facilitate the holding 
of a constitutional convention would pass constitutional muster. 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Manheim & Howard, supra note 33, at 1234–35 (“[B]ecause the device adopted in 1911 
did not lay ‘within the lines of the original instrument,’ . . . it seems to have been a revision. As 
such, the initiative process was likely improperly adopted. . . . [But] is there not a point at which 
it becomes legitimate through acceptance, history, and usage?”). 
  
Winter 2011] POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 633 
III.  ASSUMING THE INITIATIVE PROCESS CAN BE USED TO  
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION TO AUTHORIZE USE OF AN  
INITIATIVE TO CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,  
CAN IT ALSO AUTHORIZE SUCH AN INITIATIVE TO  
PROVIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF CONVENTION DELEGATES BY A 
DIFFERENT METHOD THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN THE  
CURRENT CONSTITUTION? 
Is there a difference of constitutional dimension between 
changing the constitution to make it easier to call for a constitutional 
convention and changing it to provide for the selection of delegates 
in a different manner? Allowing for the selection of delegates in a 
different manner opens the door to manipulation of the results, to the 
detriment of minority interests deserving of protection against 
majority dominance. This might have been the case, for example, if 
the proponents of the measure held invalid in Raven had sought to 
further their goal by calling for a constitutional convention with 
delegates chosen from among prosecutors throughout the state. But 
any plan for the selection of delegates would have to comply with 
federal equal protection principles, as well as the requirements of the 
federal Voting Rights Act. 37 Moreover, the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in Strauss seems to have rejected the argument that 
the California Constitution contains provisions that are so embedded 
that they cannot be altered by initiative. It would certainly be 
preferable, for both legal and policy reasons, that any initiative 
authorizing modifications in the delegate-selection procedure provide 
for a method that is broadly representative of the electorate. 38 Subject 
to that qualification, the answer to the question posed in the heading 
to this part would seem to be yes. 
 
 37. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006). 
 38. See Constitutional Convention Ballot Measures Fact Sheet, supra note 7. The Repair 
California proposal for authorizing a convention call would have required “fair methods for 
selecting or electing delegates.” Id. The proposal for the convention call prescribed a rather 
elaborate procedure. 
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IV.  ON THE SAME ASSUMPTION, CAN THE INITIATIVE AUTHORIZING 
USE OF AN INITIATIVE TO CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
ALSO AUTHORIZE SUCH AN INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE  
THAT THE CONVENTION WILL BE LIMITED TO, OR NOT EXTEND TO, 
CERTAIN SPECIFIED SUBJECTS? 
There is language in Livermore that would suggest the answer is 
no: “[T]he entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the 
convention. The character and extent of a constitution that may be 
framed by that body is freed from any limitations other than those 
contained in the constitution of the United States.” 39 But Livermore 
was decided before the 1911 direct-democracy amendments; this 
statement was pure dicta—the court did not consider the possibility 
that the call for the convention would itself place a limit on the scope 
of issues to be considered. Furthermore, there is a substantial body of 
authority, as well as reasoning, to support an affirmative response. 40 
At the time Livermore was decided, there was virtually no 
authority on or experience with limited constitutional conventions. 
One leading treatise published in 1867 argued that limitations are 
valid even if imposed by the legislature. 41 W. Dodd, writing in 1910, 
expressed a contrary view of legislative authority. 42 Roger Hoar 
proclaimed in his 1917 treatise on the basis of popular sovereignty 
that while the legislature could not impose limitations, the people 
could do so. 43 During the twentieth century, however, a consensus 
emerged: 
The prevailing view . . . treats a convention as the agent of 
the people who have called it. Thus, where the people must 
vote to approve the calling of a convention . . . the people 
are seen to have given their implicit approval to limitations 
 
 39. Livermore, 36 P. at 426. 
 40. The authorities are gathered in Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: 
The State Precedents, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 562 (1982) and more recently in ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 392–97 (2009). See also Henry D. 
Levine, Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the State Experience, 
11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 127, 134 (1973) (discussing substantive limitations for conventions among 
numerous states). 
 41. See JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: 
THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 365 (1887). 
 42. See WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 79–80 (1910). 
 43. See ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, 
POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 91, 108, 122–23 (1917). 
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on the convention’s power contained in the enabling 
legislation that put the question of calling a convention to 
the people. 44 
As noted by the leading contemporary authority on state 
constitutions, Professor Robert Williams, the majority of state 
judicial rulings tend to confirm this point, 45 as does actual practice: 
“[A]bout 15 percent of all state constitutional conventions were 
substantially limited, and the proportion increased since World War 
II.” 46 
But, the skeptics will legitimately inquire, what about the 
runaway convention, whose delegates ignore the limitations that 
have been imposed and seek to submit to the electorate provisions 
that lay outside those limits, perhaps in violation of an oath they took 
upon becoming a delegate? The answer lies in external legal 
constraints: the governing constitutional provision, or the call for the 
convention, may preclude submission to the voters of extra-agenda 
proposals, and both election officials and courts may be directed to 
enforce that preclusion. Courts that have considered the question 
have been willing to enforce limitations by ordering extra-agenda 
proposals off the ballot. 47 
 
 44. A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1182 
(1974). 
 45. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 394. See Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Va. 1945) 
(“If [the people] vote in favor of such a convention, they and not the legislature will limit the 
work of the convention and its scope.”); see also Cummings v. Beeler, 223 S.W.2d 913, 917, 921 
(Tenn. 1949) (agreeing with the holding in Staples v. Gilmer); cf. Gaines v. O’Connell, 204 
S.W.2d 425, 431–32 (Ky. 1947) (upholding the legislature’s requirement, not otherwise contained 
in the state Constitution, that the people ratify the convention results). But cf. Opinion of the 
Justices, 81 So. 2d 678, 679–83 (Ala. 1955) (interpreting in a 4–3 Alabama Supreme Court 
opinion Alabama’s constitution to preclude limits). As Professor Williams observes, the Alabama 
court’s opinion is based on questionable reasoning and is, in any event, amenable to a 
constitutional amendment that would provide for the option of a limited constitutional 
convention. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 395. While these cases involved conventions called by 
legislative action with ratification by popular vote, the governing principle, popular sovereignty, 
would clearly apply a fortiori to a convention called directly by popular vote. Id.  
 46. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 392 (citing Levine, supra note 40, at 133 n.32). Some state 
constitutions—for example, those in Kansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—expressly provide 
for calling a constitutional convention with a limited agenda. The Alaska Constitution, on the 
other hand, expressly precludes limits on the powers of the convention, and the Montana 
Constitution specifies that a convention called through the use of the initiative must be unlimited. 
Id. at 392–93. 
 47. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425–28 (Cal. 1894). When the question is raised after 
the voters have already ratified the extra-agenda proposals, courts are split on whether relief may 
be granted. Compare Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1975) (entertaining 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
There is a principled basis for sustaining the validity of an 
initiative measure that would (1) amend the state constitution to 
permit the people to call a constitutional convention through a ballot 
measure and (2) authorize such a convention call both to specify a 
procedure for selecting delegates different from that specified in the 
current constitution and to specify limits on the convention’s agenda, 
subject to judicial enforcement. Whether sufficient consensus exists, 
or can be developed, to adopt such an initiative measure and to adopt 
the delegates’ recommendations is, of course, an entirely different 
question. 
 
 
postelection challenge), with Malinou v. Powers, 333 A.2d. 420, 422 (R.I. 1975) (declaring 
postelection challenge moot). 
